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Objective: According to a still-controversial view of recognition, projections between the perirhinal
cortex and the medial subdivision of the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus (mMDT) support the mnemonic
processes underlying familiarity, whereas a separate extended hippocampal system is critical for the
recollection of episodic details during recognition. Method: In this study, we examined item recognition,
familiarity, and recollection for faces and words in a patient (OG) with a right-sided lesion centered on
the mMDT, which encroached on the central medial midline nucleus and may have resulted in partial
disconnection of the mammillothalamic tract. On the basis of OG’s neuropathology, the dual-process
signal-detection (DPSD) high-threshold theory and the material-specific hypothesis of long-term memory
together predicted a material-specific impairment in familiarity for novel facial memoranda, with a lesser
decline in recollection of novel faces at short retention intervals. No abnormalities in either familiarity-
or recollection-driven recognition of verbal memoranda were expected. Results: Comparing the perfor-
mance of OG and that of a group of 10 age-, sex-, and IQ-matched healthy controls, the remember–know
procedure revealed the dissociations predicted by the material-specific and DPSD hypotheses: With
recognition of previously novel faces, OG showed a deficit in familiarity-driven recognition that was
significantly greater than the insignificant reduction in his recollection. All components of his word
recognition were, however, preserved. Conclusion: A memory profile, marked by a dissociation between
familiarity and recollection, fits naturally with the DPSD model and is incompatible with the idea that
these kinds of memories reflect different degrees of trace strength.
Keywords: mediodorsal thalamus, material specificity, recognition, remember– know, recollection
familiarity
There is still disagreement about the extent to which the under-
lying processes that drive familiarity and recollection of episodic
information during recognition memory are nonoverlapping and,
relatedly, the extent to which they depend on distinct neural
mechanisms, particularly in the medial temporal lobes (MTLs) and
their direct connections in the midline diencephalon (e.g., Aggle-
ton & Brown, 1999; Atkinson & Juola, 1973; Cohen et al., 2008;
Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler,
1980; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Rotello,
Macmillan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005; Squire, Wixted, & Clark,
2007; Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Mickes, 2010; Wixted & Squire,
2011; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010).
Recollection occurs when a studied stimulus cues the recall of
one or more contextual details linked to the stimulus. This cued
recall usually strongly confirms that the stimulus was previously
encountered. Familiarity occurs when a studied stimulus feels as if
it has been encountered previously without the occurrence of any
cued recall. It also confirms stimulus recognition, but simply as a
function of how strongly the stimulus feels familiar.
On the one hand, there are models, such as the dual-process
signal-detection (DPSD) hypothesis (Yonelinas, 1994; for reviews,
see Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Yonelinas, 2002), that propose that
the processes that respectively underlie recollection and familiarity
are partially distinct and have different neural bases in the MTLs.
The DPSD hypothesis also proposes that recollection varies con-
tinuously in strength from strong to weak but that below its
strength threshold, nothing is recollected that supports discrimina-
tion between studied and nonstudied items (Yonelinas et al., 2010).
This kind of memory involves several processes, mediated by a
neural system that involves the hippocampus, fornix, mammillary
bodies, mammillothalamic tract (MTT), and anterior nucleus of the
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thalamus. In contrast, familiarity varies continuously in strength in
a normally distributed manner and is well described by signal-
detection theory. This kind of memory is mediated by a system that
involves the perirhinal cortex, a projection from the perirhinal
cortex, via the dorsal amygdala/external capsule and then via the
inferior thalamic peduncle, to the medial subdivision of the medi-
odorsal thalamic nucleus (mMDT; Haskins, Yonelinas, Quamme,
& Ranganath, 2008; Montaldi, Spencer, Roberts, & Mayes, 2006;
Russchen, Amaral, & Price, 1987; Saunders, Mishkin, & Aggle-
ton, 2005; Vann et al., 2009) and perhaps projections to the
ventromedial frontal cortex (for review, see Aggleton, 2012;
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Montaldi & Mayes,
2010; Ranganath, 2010). Accounts like this predict a double dis-
sociation between recollection and familiarity following selective
lesions of the hippocampal–anterior thalamic or perirhinal cortex–
mMDT brain networks, respectively.
A recent thalamic extension of the Aggleton and Brown (1999)
model (Aggleton, Dumont, & Warburton, 2011) provided a pos-
sible mechanism by which recollection impairments can develop
following pathology that falls outside of the core hippocampal
system. This multieffect multinuclei (MEMN) model includes the
DPSD proposal that the core hippocampal system is selectively
critical for recollection and the perirhinal–mMDT circuit for fa-
miliarity but adds the suggestion that other medial thalamic nu-
clei—comprising the intralaminar (center median) and midline
(central medial, paraventricular, parataenial, rhomboid, reuniens)
thalamic nuclei—can influence recollection. The suggestion is that
they do this either by modulating a subcortical–cortical arousal
and attention system that includes the reticular activating system
and the reticular thalamic nucleus (Portas et al., 1998; Van der
Werf, Witter, & Groenewegen, 2002; Van Der Werf, Jolles, Witter
& Uylings, 2003) or by disrupting learning and memory by dis-
connecting indirect projections between the intralaminar (center
median) and midline (central medial, paraventricular, parataenial,
rhomboid, reuniens) thalamic nuclei and the hippocampal forma-
tion (Amaral & Cowan, 1980). The MEMN model also suggests
that damage to the midline nuclei could impair familiarity because,
like the mMDT, a subset of these midline nuclei (paraventricular,
parataenial, rhomboid, reunion) are connected with the perirhinal
and entorhinal cortices (see Aggleton et al., 2011; Pergola et al.,
2012). Consequently, damage to the midline nuclei may also cause
a familiarity deficit.
The mMDT and the intralaminar and midline thalamic nuclei
reside in close proximity to each other, so lesions of the mMDT
may extend to these nuclei and, consequently, have the potential to
disrupt both kinds of memory. However, it is important to note that
when this happens, any decline in recollection may be secondary
to reticular thalamic nucleus damage that disrupts the subcortical–
cortical arousal and attention system; disruption of connections
between the midline and intralaminar thalamic nuclei, disrupting
the mnemonic processes supported by the extended hippocampal
system; or both of these.
On the other hand, there are models, such as the single-process
unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) model (e.g., Donald-
son, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Rotello et al., 2005; Squire et al., 2007;
Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Mickes, 2010; Wixted & Squire, 2011),
that propose that familiarity and recollection are not two kinds of
memory mediated by separate perirhinal and hippocampal sys-
tems, respectively, but involve common underlying processes that
are mediated by the same MTL structures and, presumably, their
extramedial temporal lobe connections. The UVSD model implies
that, although familiarity and recollection signals may sometimes
occur in relative isolation, they are usually combined in a recog-
nition memory strength signal such that the likelihood of a positive
recognition decision is a function of perceived memory strength.
As such, the combined signal varies on a continuum of recognition
memory strength, with recollection typically making a strong
contribution that leads to confident, fast, and accurate recognition
judgments. Familiarity, in contrast, is often less confident and
diagnostic, often yielding less accurate contributions to recogni-
tion, although when the familiarity signal is strong, it can support
highly confident, diagnostic, and accurate contributions to recog-
nition, just like recollection. According to this view, the extended
hippocampal and perirhinal cortex systems support both strong and
weak recognition memory in a functionally homogeneous way,
regardless of whether this is driven primarily by recollection or by
familiarity. Damage, therefore, to either system should disrupt
both kinds of memory, although recollection—being typically
stronger and, therefore, more functionally demanding than famil-
iarity of their common support structures—is likely to be more
seriously disrupted following small lesions (see Montaldi &
Mayes, 2010). By the same reasoning, small lesions in the perirhi-
nal cortex system should impair the typically weak familiarity less
than they impair the typically stronger recollection.
It remains disputed whether hypotheses like the DPSD view
(and its MEMN extension) or the UVSD view best explain the
effects of lesions within the MTLs, because different studies have
found discrepant results, for reasons that are not currently under-
stood (see Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Eichenbaum et
al., 2007; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; Ranganath, 2010; Wixted &
Squire, 2004). There has been very little exploration of whether
recollection/familiarity dissociations are found following specific
thalamic damage, and here the problem is exacerbated by several
factors, which include the rarity of patients with ischemic lesions
in diencephalic structures of interest. In vivo measurement of
structural or functional disruption/integrity of the gray matter
nuclei and white matter tracts in the densely packed thalamus is an
order of magnitude harder than the equivalent (already difficult)
task for the MTLs because of the much smaller size of the critical
thalamic nuclei relative to MTL structures, such as the hippocam-
pus, and the relatively low spatial resolution of most contemporary
structural MRI protocols (for a recent review, see Carlesimo,
Lombardi, & Caltagirone, 2011; for details of recent strategies for
better identification of thalamic nuclei, see Saranathan, Tourdias,
Bayram, Ghanouni, & Rutt, 2015; Serra et al., 2013; Tourdias,
Saranathan, Levesque, Su, & Rutt, 2014).
Functional MRI (fMRI) indicates that recollection and familiar-
ity rely on distinct neural substrates (e.g., Montaldi et al., 2006;
Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005;
see also Diana et al., 2007), and Montaldi et al.’s event-related
fMRI study in particular provided indirect support for mMDT
involvement in familiarity memory. In that study, self-reported
familiarity strength for scenes was associated with activation in a
network of structures that included the perirhinal cortex and the
left mediodorsal thalamic nucleus (MDT) as well as other struc-
tures, including the insula, left superior temporal cortex, left ven-
trolateral and anteromedial frontal cortex, posterior cingulate cor-
tex, and left parietal neocortex. Hippocampal activity was not
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modulated by changes in familiarity strength even when this was
matched to the strength of recollection, which activated the hip-
pocampus more, contrary to the UVSD model. The activation
within the region of the MDT, reported in Montaldi et al. and in a
later study of object familiarity and recollection by Kafkas and
Montaldi (2014), seems unlikely to have involved the lateral or
parvicellular MDT, because lesion research implicates this part of
the MDT in recall/recollection (Pergola & Suchan, 2013).
To date, the evidence that disruption of the perirhinal–mMDT
circuit impairs familiarity at all, let alone familiarity exclusively in
clinical cases, is sparse (Bowles et al., 2007; Martin, Bowles,
Mirsattari & Köhler, 2011; see reviews by Carlesimo et al., 2011,
2015; Pergola & Suchan, 2013). Although a number of studies
have reported selective recollection deficits following damage to
the hippocampus and its midline diencephalic projections (for a
review, see Montaldi & Mayes, 2010), there have been far fewer
studies exploring whether perirhinal cortex lesions disrupt famil-
iarity (and, if so, whether this effect is selective) and none, as far
as we know, of whether lesions to its thalamic projections have
similar effects. There have been some large group studies of aging
participants suggesting a selective familiarity-disruptive effect of
damage to perirhinal cortex and related medial temporal neocor-
tical regions (e.g., Wolk et al., 2011; Yonelinas et al., 2007). One
case study of a patient, NB, who had suffered left anterior temporal
cortex damage, which included large parts of the perirhinal and
entorhinal cortex damage, found—using several measures com-
prising the remember–know procedure, an examination of receiver
operating characteristics, and a response deadline procedure—that
she had a selective impairment of word familiarity during recog-
nition testing (Bowles et al., 2007; Bowles, O’Neil, Mirsattari,
Poppenk, & Köhler, 2011; Martin et al., 2011). Both structural
MRI and fMRI indicated that the hippocampus was working
normally, which was consistent with NB’s preserved verbal rec-
ollection (Bowles et al., 2007, 2011; Martin et al., 2011).
The aim of our study was to investigate familiarity- and
recollection-driven recognition of verbal and facial memoranda in
a patient, OG, with a right-sided medial MDT lesion that may have
also resulted in a less extensive, partial disconnection of the MTT.
Both UVSD and DPSD views of recognition, together with the
material-specific hypothesis of long-term memory, predict that our
patient’s right-sided diencephalic lesion will be marked by an
unfamiliar facial but not verbal recognition impairment over short
retention intervals. However, the UVSD view predicts that recol-
lection will be at least as impaired as familiarity and probably
more so because it is typically stronger and more demanding of the
structures that support it. In contrast, the DPSD view (and its
MEMN extension) predicts that familiarity will be at least as
impaired as recollection and probably more so provided that dam-
age to the MTT is minor and that the structures that the MEMN
model proposes to be recollection supportive have either only
minor to no damage or turn out not to be recollection supportive.
These predictions were tested using two yes/no recognition
memory tasks (RMTs) designed to separately assess verbal and
facial recognition. Both tasks were extensively piloted prior to
their use in this study to ensure that they were demanding but not
so difficult that performance would be at floor. Estimates of
recollection of episodic details and the assessment of familiarity
during recognition were obtained using the remember–know pro-
cedure (Tulving, 1985). The remember–know procedure was cho-
sen in preference to process estimation methods (e.g., the process
dissociation procedure [Jacoby, 1991]; receiver operating charac-
teristic curves [Yonelinas & Parks, 2007]; structural equation
modeling [Quamme, Yonelinas, Widaman, Kroll, & Sauve, 2004])
which provide overall indications of performance. The remember–
know procedure was used properly by ensuring that participants
were carefully instructed; checks were made to ensure that they
were doing as instructed and understood correctly what recollec-
tion and familiarity were, so the procedure differentiated between
recollection and familiarity on a trial-by-trial basis with sufficient
accuracy to draw valid conclusions as, for example, by fMRI (for
a full discussion of these points, see Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi,
2012).
The UVSD model cannot explain the kind of double dissocia-
tion predicted by the DPSD hypothesis (see Montaldi & Mayes,
2010) unless its supporters can persuasively argue that it is in some
way artifactual. They might attempt to do this by using the UVSD
framework to argue that if familiarity was underreported and
recollection overreported, a patient might artifactually appear to
have impaired familiarity and intact recollection. This could occur,
on the UVSD strength view, if the recognition strength (or confi-
dence) threshold for recollection was lowered by patients, who
became willing to report, as recollected, stimuli they were less
confident they had recognized. These patients would then be
correspondingly less willing to report as familiar these more con-
fidently recognized stimuli, so their “weaker” familiarity responses
should be less accurate and able to discriminate studied from
unstudied stimuli, giving the artifactual appearance of a familiarity
deficit. It is unclear, however, whether this lowering of patients’
recognition confidence threshold for reporting recollection would
lead to the illusion that their recollection was as able to discrim-
inate studied and unstudied stimuli as that of controls. This is
because the inclusion of recollection that is less confident in this
sense might well lower the average ability to make this discrimi-
nation rather than raise it at all, let alone to normal levels. In other
words, it may raise the hit rate, but it will also raise the false alarm
rate so as to reduce studied–unstudied discrimination ability. The
overreporting of recollection and underreporting of familiarity
argument is, therefore, an uncertain means of showing that any
apparently normal patient recollection, and disproportionately im-
paired familiarity, is an artifact. It is also based on what we think
is the false view that recollection/familiarity decisions reflect lev-
els of recognition confidence rather than judgments about whether
one has recalled study-context details. Despite these two problems
of the argument, we tested the possibility that our patient was
overreporting recollection by seeing whether his recollection re-
porting bias was shifted in the direction of greater liberality. To do
this, we used signal-detection theory as implied by the UVSD
model and the assumption that the familiarity/recollection decision
threshold is based on confidence/memory strength, as argued by,
for example, Dunn (2004) and Wixted (2007). We also tested
whether the patient’s familiarity was unreported because of his
familiarity bias shifting in the opposite and more conservative
direction to his liberal recollection bias.
There is also uncertainty about whether stimuli that were very
familiar even prior to a study episode, such as words or famous
faces, can be recognized as having occurred in the study episode
on the basis of item familiarity alone or if a form of item–study
context associative familiarity as well as recollection is necessary
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for accurate performance (although the existence of item–study
context associations is contentious; see Montaldi & Mayes, 2010).
However, faces that were novel prior to the study episode should
be easily recognizable on the basis of item familiarity alone,
because people only need to recognize whether they have seen
studied faces anywhere before (see Smith et al., 2014). Face–study
context associative familiarity is only likely to be important when
people are asked to recognize in which of two study contexts
previously novel faces appeared earlier. We, therefore, used
remember–know procedure instructions that were focused on sim-
ple face familiarity and had only one study episode.
Participants and RMTs
Participants
The patient. The patient, OG, is a 74-year-old right-handed
man with an estimated IQ in the high average range: 116 (National
Adult Reading Test [NART; Nelson & Willison, 1991]; see Table
1). OG formally worked as an electrical engineer before retiring in
2000. He now enjoys an active lifestyle, spending time playing
bridge, cooking for himself and his wife, walking up to 25 miles
per week, and caring for his grandchildren. OG had a 30-year
history of visual migraines and hypertension prior to suffering an
ischemic stroke in 2000. Apart from the resultant focal mMDT
lesion, no other ischemic changes were evident on his magnetic
resonance scan (performed in 2010 and reported in more detail in
the next section).
OG has a material-specific selective impairment in visual item
recognition and visual recall memory and sparing of verbal item
recognition and verbal recall (Doors and People Test [Baddeley,
Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1994]; Rey Complex Figure Test [My-
ers & Myers, 1995]; Logical Memory subtest [Wechsler, 1993];
see Edelstyn, Mayes, Denby, & Ellis, 2012).
His short-term memory (STM) and working memory (Forward
Digit Span and Forward Spatial subtests, Reverse Spatial, and
Digit Span; Wechsler, 1997) are also intact on all but the most
taxing of tasks (Letter/Number Sequence; Wechsler, 1997). Atten-
tion is spared under conditions of low demand (Unimodal Vigi-
lance, Unimodal Selective Attention, and Simple Flexibility sub-
tests; Zimmermann & Fimm, 1995) but impaired under high task
demand (Bimodal Vigilance, Divided Attention, Complex Flexi-
bility, and Covert Attention subtests; Zimmermann & Fimm,
1995). Evidence of executive dysfunction is also present on some
tests (the Hayling Test of response initiation and response inhibi-
tion [Burgess & Shallice, 1997]; phonetic and semantic fluency)
but not others (the Brixton Test of spatial anticipation [Burgess &
Shallice, 1997]; alternating fluency; see Edelstyn, Mayes, & Ellis,
2014).
The healthy control group. A group of 10 healthy men was
matched to OG for age, modified t(●●●) 1.35, p .11; premorbid
crystallized intelligence (NART), modified t(●●●)0.51, p .31;
and anxiety and depression, modified t(●●●)  0.07, p  47. The
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales (Zigmond & Snaith,
1983) provided control data for the RMTs. Participant demo-
graphic and neuropsychological characteristics are presented in
Table 1.
Anonymity and study approval. The patient’s initials have
been changed to preserve anonymity. This study was approved by
the North Staffordshire National Health Service research ethics
committee and conducted in accordance with good clinical prac-
tice (European Medicines Agency, 2002).
Structural Brain Imaging
The structural magnetic resonance images were acquired using
a 3Tesla Magnetron Trio whole-body imaging system (Siemens
Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany). A series of 10 consecutive
T2-weighted horizontal slices (slice thickness  1 mm) are shown
in Figure 1. The following sequence parameters were used: repe-
tition time  1,960 ms, echo time  4.43 ms, inversion time 
1,100 ms, flip angle  8°, and field of view  256  256 mm.
The scans were visualized using MRIcro (●●●) and BrainVoy-
ager (●●●) software and showed a small focal lesion lateralized to
the right medial subdivision of the MDT. Apart from normal
age-related changes and the focal medial thalamic lesion, no ad-
ditional neuropathology was evident on the scans.
Previously published MRIs showed that OG’s lesion also en-
croached on the internal medullary lamina, the central lateral
intralaminar nucleus, the central medial and paraventricular mid-
line nuclei, the parvicellular and paralamellar subdivisions of the
MDT, and the MTT, thereby partially disconnecting the indirect
hippocampal projections to the anterior thalamus that run via the
mammillary bodies. The ventrolateral portion of the dorsal thala-
mus also appeared to be damaged. The anterior, ventral, and lateral
thalamic nuclei were spared (see Edelstyn et al., 2012, 2014).
Yes/No RMTs
Stimuli. The verbal RMT was constructed from 98 4–6-letter
words (mean word frequency  229.2 per million [range: 83–
1,789], mean concreteness  462.7, and mean imageability 
491.2) using the norms provided by Coltheart (1981) and Baayen,
Piepenbrock, and van Rijn (1993). The pool comprised 49 high-
frequency words (mean word frequency  229.2 per million
Table 1
Demographic and Neuropsychological Characteristics of Patient
OG and the Healthy Control Group
Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale
Participant Age (years) IQ Anxiety Depression Total
HC 1 66 111 5 1 6
HC 2 72 119 5 0 5
HC 3 72 122 0 0 0
HC 6 72 117 5 2 7
HC 8 74 117 6 1 7
HC 10 69 124 3 2 5
HC 11 66 120 10 0 10
HC 13 66 119 4 4 8
HC 14 63 117 4 1 5
HC 15 63 114 4 1 5
M 68.30 118.00 4.60 1.20 5.80
1 SD 4.03 3.74 2.50 1.23 2.62
OG 74 116 3 3 6
Mod. t 1.35 0.51 0.07
p .11 .31 .47
Note. HC  healthy control; Mod.  modified.
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[range: 83–1,789], mean concreteness  462.7, and mean image-
ability  491.2) and 49 low-frequency words (mean word fre-
quency  1.9 per million [range: 1–3], mean concreteness 
472.1, and mean imageability  482.7). Twenty-four words from
each pool were combined to form the target set and the lure set
(i.e., ns  48, respectively). Both sets were matched for word
frequency (targets: M  115.4 per million [range: 1–1,461],
SD  160.51; lures: M  115.65 per million [range: 1–1,789],
SD  160.87), concreteness (targets: M  467.9, SD  6.36;
lures: M  466.9, SD  8.79), and imageability (targets: M 
487.2, SD  6.08; lures: M  486.5, SD  5.66). Forty-eight
target verbal memoranda were presented at study, and these were
randomly interleaved with 48 lures at test.
The visual RMT was constructed from 100 black-and-white
photographic images of novel male and female faces of people
between 18 and 60 years of age. Each image was presented face
on, with the hair and ears cropped to exclude any additional
contextual details that might have supported recognition.
The stimuli were presented on a 17-in. monitor at a viewing
distance of 70 cm. The visual angle subtended by the words was
0.82° horizontal  3.27° (minimum)–4.91° (maximum) vertical
(depending on the number of letters in the word), and for the facial
images, the visual angle was 6.54° horizontal  8.58° vertical.
Fifty target facial memoranda were presented at study, and these
were randomly interleaved with 50 lures at test.
Both RMTs were programmed in E-Prime Version 2 (Psychol-
ogy Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA; Schneider, Eschman, &
Zuccolotto, 2002).
Procedure. At study, participants saw the target memoranda
for 3 s each (3-s interstimulus interval) and made a verbal judg-
ment as to whether the item was pleasant or unpleasant. The verbal
stimuli were presented once at study, whereas the facial stimuli
were presented three times prior to the test phase (to avoid floor
effects, on the basis of pilot work).
Immediately after completion of the study phase, recognition
using the yes/no procedure was tested by presenting each of the
targets randomly intermixed with a matched number of lures. Each
item at test was presented individually, and yes/no recognition
judgments were made within a 3-s response window. Following
each endorsement, irrespective of whether the item was a target or
a lure, a second-stage remember–know judgment was made.
The same procedure was followed for both RMTs. They were
completed in a sound-attenuated lab with normal lighting condi-
tions, and the order of the verbal and facial RMTs was counter-
balanced across participants.
Performance measures. Correct identification of a target
item was defined as a hit, whereas false recognition of a lure was
termed a false alarm. Following each endorsement, irrespective of
whether it was a hit or false alarm, participants made a subjective
judgment of their recognition experience in terms of either feelings
of familiarity without any recollection (know response) or a spe-
cific recollection of the item having been previously presented
(remember response). Although the second stage was not time
constrained, participants were encouraged to respond as quickly as
possible while remaining accurate. Participants were familiarized
with the experimental set-up and the criteria for making remember
and know decisions with a practice test prior to completing the
main RMTs.
Remember–know instructions. Participants were instructed
that a remember response could be given only if, when presented
with a probe item, they recollected at least one of the following: (a)
the item that appeared just before or after the currently tested probe
item during the study session; (b) personal memories, mental
images, or words that came to mind when the probe was presented
during the study session; or (c) an emotional reaction that the
currently tested probe triggered during the study session. These
instructions aimed to ensure that recollection was only reported
when a participant had recalled one or more things that he was
thinking of when he was processing the probe during study.
Know responses were only recorded if participants recognized
the probe as having been presented in the study session but did not
recall any specific details associated with it from the study session.
Although guess responses are sometimes also included in the
remember–know procedure, they were not used here for two
reasons. First, their use was unwarranted because familiarity mem-
ory discrimination scores were corrected using the familiarity false
alarm rate. Therefore, if any familiarity response was really a
guess rather than a weak familiarity response, this was fully
corrected. Second, it was likely that the extra complexity would
confuse participants. Such confusion is highly undesirable, be-
cause there is evidence that unless instructions are kept simple and
are fully understood, participants can too frequently fail to follow
them properly (for a full discussion of these points, see Migo et al.,
2012).
Participants were asked to justify each remember and know
judgment throughout the test phase to ensure that they maintained
a full understanding of the criteria for making these types of
decisions, in line with published recommendations on measuring
recollection and familiarity using the remember–know procedure
(Migo et al., 2012). The experimenter recorded recognition deci-
sions on behalf of each participant. Endorsements of probes at test
were entered as remember only if context was provided and as
know in the absence of context.
Familiarity and recollection memory discrimination scores were
calculated by first computing the familiarity and recollection hit
rates and false alarm rates. To calculate the hit and false alarm
rates for familiarity, it was assumed, following Yonelinas and
Jacoby (1995), that familiarity responses are stochastically inde-
pendent of each other. On the basis of fMRI data, introspective
experience, and general plausibility arguments, there are strong
reasons to suppose that this assumption is much nearer to reality
than the assumption that familiarity and recollection have an
Figure 1. Ten consecutive horizontal magnetic resonance MR slices
(thickness  1 mm) showing patient OG’s right lateralized lesion centered
on the magnocellular subdivision of his mediodorsal thalamic nucleus. R
right of midline.
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exclusivity relationship or that every recollection response is al-
ways accompanied by a familiarity response (redundancy; for a
full development of these arguments, see Migo et al., 2012).
Applying the independence assumption to the corrected know
scores, the reported measure of familiarity was calculated accord-
ing to the following formula: know hit or false alarm rate/(1 
remember hit or false alarm rate).
To eliminate extreme hit rates of 1 or 0 or false alarm rates of
0, as the corresponding z scores are infinite, all reported hit and
false alarm rates have been corrected by adding 0.5 to each
frequency and dividing by N  1, where N is the number of old or
new trials (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). For consistency, this
correction has been applied routinely, even in the absence of 0s
and 1s.
Estimates of item recognition and familiarity hit and false alarm
rates were used to calculate a signal-detection index (d=), whereas
a threshold measure of recollection (pr) was calculated by sub-
tracting the recollection false alarm rate from the hit rate. The
familiarity response bias was also measured using the signal-
detection criterion (C). To examine the UVSD view that the
presence of a familiarity deficit and sparing of recollection reflects
a combination of familiarity underreporting (a conservative re-
sponse bias) and recollection overreporting (a liberal response
bias), the same response-bias measure (C) was also taken for
recollection, following the arguments of Dunn (2004) and Wixted
(2007).
Results
Recognition memory; know and remember hit and false alarm
rates; and DPSD estimates of item recognition, recollection, and
familiarity are reported for OG and the control group in Table 2
and Figure 2. Standard (z) scores, presented in Figure 3, and
modified t tests have been used to indicate impairment
(Singlims_ES.exe; Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002).
At short retention intervals, OG showed a material-specific
impairment in item recognition (z  2.83), modified
t(●●●)  2.69, p  .01, and familiarity-driven recognition of
Table 2
Recognition Memory; Hit and False Alarm Rates; and Item Recognition, Recollection, and Familiarity for Patient OG and the
Healthy Control Group
Item recognition Remember Recollection Know Familiarity
Participant HR FAR d= HR FAR pr C HR FAR d= C
Facial recognition memory
HC 1 0.81 0.02 2.13 0.26 0.01 0.25 1.80 0.56 0.11 1.94 0.09
HC 2 0.75 0.01 1.74 0.34 0.03 0.31 1.35 0.42 0.13 1.48 0.20
HC 3 0.93 0.02 1.89 0.64 0.19 0.45 0.09 0.30 0.17 1.81 0.57
HC 6 0.79 0.02 2.31 0.34 0.03 0.31 1.35 0.46 0.05 2.17 0.29
HC 8 0.72 0.01 1.54 0.21 0.11 0.10 1.44 0.52 0.07 1.82 0.32
HC 10 0.72 0.01 1.20 0.50 0.19 0.31 0.45 0.23 0.09 1.11 0.74
HC 11 0.87 0.02 2.19 0.70 0.03 0.67 0.43 0.19 0.13 1.41 0.27
HC 13 0.85 0.02 1.94 0.28 0.05 0.24 1.40 0.58 0.15 1.89 0.36
HC 14 0.85 0.02 1.62 0.15 0.07 0.08 1.79 0.72 0.23 1.69 0.64
HC 15 0.81 0.02 1.65 0.03 0.01 0.02 3.06 0.79 0.23 1.65 0.54
M 0.81 0.02 1.82 0.35 0.07 0.27 1.32 0.48 0.13 1.70 0.04
1 SD 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.85 0.20 0.06 0.30 0.47
OG 0.68 0.34 0.86 0.44 0.17 0.27 0.63 0.25 0.19 0.61 0.53
z score 2.83 0.00 0.80 3.62 1.22
Mod. t 2.69 0.00 0.77 3.46 1.16
p 0.01 0.50 0.23 0.001 0.14
Word recognition memory
HC 1 0.93 0.03 3.38 0.89 0.50 0.88 0.07 0.05 0.03 1.77 1.06
HC 2 0.74 0.03 2.53 0.60 0.50 0.59 0.90 0.15 0.03 1.57 1.23
HC 3 0.91 0.13 2.44 0.64 2.50 0.59 0.45 0.28 0.05 2.35 0.06
HC 6 0.74 0.05 2.29 0.56 0.50 0.55 1.01 0.19 0.05 1.48 0.96
HC 8 0.64 0.30 0.90 0.23 2.50 0.18 1.54 0.42 0.26 0.73 0.19
HC 10 0.70 0.21 1.33 0.52 7.50 0.37 0.46 0.19 0.07 1.13 0.93
HC 11 0.97 0.03 3.74 0.95 0.50 0.94 0.48 0.03 0.03 2.12 0.68
HC 13 0.87 0.13 2.11 0.74 1.50 0.71 0.28 0.13 0.11 1.22 0.61
HC 14 0.85 0.09 2.35 0.64 0.50 0.63 0.79 0.21 0.01 2.57 0.90
HC 15 0.72 0.03 2.47 0.64 0.50 0.63 0.79 0.09 0.03 1.22 1.59
M 0.81 0.10 2.35 0.64 1.70 0.61 0.57 0.18 0.07 1.62 0.82
1 SD 0.11 0.09 0.83 0.20 2.20 0.22 0.57 0.11 0.07 0.58 0.46
OG 0.87 0.03 2.99 0.52 0.50 0.51 1.11 0.36 0.03 2.53 0.28
z score 0.75 0.35 0.94 1.55 1.20
Mod. t 0.74 0.43 0.90 1.50 1.12
p 0.24 0.34 0.20 0.08 0.15
Note. Bolded values indicate • • •. HR  hit rate; FAR  false alarm rate; d=  signal-detection index; pr  threshold measure of recollection; C 
signal-detection criterion; HC  healthy control; Mod.  modified.
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unfamiliar facial memoranda (z  3.62), modified
t(●●●)  3.46, p  .001. Recollection of novel facial memo-
randa, in contrast, was spared (z  0.00). The familiarity response
criterion of OG was not significantly more conservative than the
criterion of the controls (z  1.22), modified t(●●●)  1.16, p 
.14, and his recollection response criterion was not significantly
more liberal than that of the controls (z  0.80), modified
t(●●●)  0.77, p  .23.
Item memory, familiarity, and recollection of verbal memoranda
at short retention intervals were also preserved (all ps  .05).
There were no significant differences in response criteria between
OG and the controls for either familiarity (z  1.20), modified
t(●●●)  1.12, p  .15, or recollection (z  0.94), modified
t(●●●)  0.90, p  .20.
In the next set of analyses, dissociations, suggested previously,
were formally investigated (Revised Standardized Difference Test
[Dissocs_ES.exe], one-tailed; Crawford & Garthwaite, 2005;
Crawford, Garthwaite, & Porter, 2010). OG showed between-
modality (novel facial vs. verbal) dissociations for item recogni-
tion (i.e., facial recognition was impaired, but verbal recognition
was spared), modified t(●●●) 2.87, p .02, and familiarity (i.e.,
facial familiarity was impaired, but verbal familiarity was spared),
modified t(●●●) 3.28, p .01, but not for recollection, modified
t(●●●)  0.30, p  .77. A within-modality (familiarity vs. recol-
lection rates) dissociation was present for novel facial memoranda
(i.e., OG’s familiarity-driven recognition of faces was impaired,
but his recollection rate was spared), modified t(●●●)  2.34, p 
.04, but absent for words, modified t(●●●)  1.43, p  .19.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to further explore the functional
relationship between the mMDT and the dual-process view of
recognition in a patient with a right-sided lesion involving the
mMDT and the central medial midline nucleus and that may have
resulted in partial disconnection of the MTT. The key behavioral
findings from this case report can be summarized as follows: First,
OG showed a dissociation between (deficient) familiarity-driven
recognition and (spared) recollection of facial memoranda, al-
though his recollection and familiarity response biases did not
differ from those of the controls. Second, OG showed no abnor-
malities in verbal item recognition, familiarity, and recollection.
These results are discussed in relation to OG’s previously docu-
mented neuropsychological profile to explore fully the implica-
tions of our findings in the context of the literature. The dissoci-
ation in OG’s memory for novel faces (impaired) and words
(preserved) at short retention intervals is consistent with an earlier
study of this same patient in which a material-specific decline in
visual memory on the Doors and People Test (Baddeley et al.,
1994) and free recall on the Rey Complex Figure Test (Myers &
Myers, 1995) and preserved recognition memory and free recall of
verbal memoranda (Logical Memory [Wechsler, 1995]; Doors and
People Test [Baddeley et al., 1994]) was reported (Edelstyn et al.,
2012). At that time, impairments were, therefore, reported not only
in forced-choice recognition but also in free recall of visual mem-
oranda, which may seem inconsistent with our current findings. It
was suggested that decline in visual recognition was caused by
disruption of the mMDT pathways on which processes supporting
familiarity-driven recognition rely, whereas the impairment in
immediate and delayed visual recall was linked to OG’s right-
sided lesion encroaching on the MTT and, thereby, partially dis-
connecting the indirect hippocampal projections to the anterior
thalamic nucleus that run via the mammillary bodies. The probable
reason why OG’s previously reported visual recall of shapes was
more impaired than his novel face recollection, which is reported
Figure 2. Item recognition (d=), familiarity (d=), and recollection (pr)
rates for patient OG and the healthy control group.
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here, are considered later. Our current findings also have implica-
tions for the unresolved debate regarding the importance of the
mMDT and the extended hippocampal circuit for familiarity/rec-
ognition and recollection/recall.
According to the UVSD view, the hippocampus (and, presum-
ably, the extended hippocampal system) supports both familiarity/
recognition and recollection/recall (Wixted, 2007; Wixted &
Squire, 2004, 2011). The dual-process view, conversely, states that
only recollection is dependent on the hippocampus and associated
structures—which include the fornix, the anterior thalamic nu-
cleus, the MTT, and the mammillary bodies—whereas familiarity,
and the recognition responses that depend on it, rely on a separate
network of structures that critically involves the perirhinal cortex
and the mMDT (Aggleton & Brown, 1999, 2006; see also Yoneli-
nas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010).
We now consider whether there are currently any hypotheses
other than a variant of the DPSD view that predict disproportionate
deficits in familiarity memory relative to recollection after tha-
lamic damage, as was found in OG. We focus, in particular, on the
UVSD model. The UVSD view must imply that recollection and
familiarity depend on overlapping structures not only in the MTL
but also in the thalamus. It also proposes that remember responses
typically generate more confident, diagnostic, and, therefore, ac-
curate recognition memories than do know responses. Such “stron-
ger” memory responses are proposed to activate the hippocampus
more on average than are usually “weaker’” responses, regardless
of whether they depend on recollection signals, the less commonly
strong familiarity signals, or both. The model also predicts that
strong recognition responses should be more disrupted by incom-
plete lesions of this structure and its thalamic connections. Both
the greater neuronal activity and the greater lesion sensitivity occur
because these strong recognition responses are supposed to de-
mand more of the resources of their mediating structures. By
extension, using the UVSD functional homogeneity claim, incom-
plete lesions of not only the perirhinal cortex but also its dien-
cephalic connections, such as the mMDT, should also impair
recollection as well as familiarity, with recollection being at least
as impaired as familiarity and possibly more impaired if sufficient
residual resources remain functional. This kind of hypothesis,
therefore, predicts that even if diencephalic lesions are truly se-
lective and damage only parts of the extended hippocampal sys-
tem, such as the anterior thalamic nucleus or the MTT—or only
parts of the extended perirhinal cortex system, such as the
mMDT—either recollection and familiarity will be equally im-
paired (if damage is extensive) or recollection will be more im-
paired (if damage is more incomplete). Effects of both kinds have
been reported, although there is controversy about whether the
lesions are truly selective in the way required by the UVSD model.
For example, patients RH, JC, and VC were equally impaired at
recollection and familiarity following lesions that involved the
hippocampus but that spared the thalamus (Bird, Shallice, &
Cipolotti, 2007; Cipolotti, Bird, Good, Macmanus, Rudge, & Shal-
lice, 2006). Other thalamic lesion patients have shown greater
recollection deficits, although these might be more consistent with
Figure 3. Estimates of patient OG’s item recognition (d=), familiarity (d=), and recollection (pr) as standard
scores (z scores) for faces and words and as test score difference scores (zs) for between- and within-modality
rates of familiarity and recollection.
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the DPSD or UVSD views, depending on the extent and locus of
the lesion. For example, if, as claimed by the authors (Carlesimo
et al., 2007; Serra et al., 2013), patient GP had a truly selective
bilateral mammillothalamic lesion with relative sparing of the
intralaminar thalamic nucleus and MDT, his focal recollection
deficit would be consistent with the DPSD view but not the UVSD
view.
But neither of these patterns of breakdown were evident for OG.
Instead, he showed a selective impairment in familiarity, with his
novel face-triggered recollection, that was not even significantly
impaired, showing significantly higher levels of sparing. The
UVSD model can only explain our results with OG by assuming
that he overreported recollection and consequentially underre-
ported familiarity so as to produce the pattern observed. Other-
wise, only variants of the DPSD predict this pattern of memory
breakdown following a right-sided mMDT lesion, consistent with
the structure playing a primary role in mediating familiarity-driven
recognition memory. The counter to this conclusion is based on
using the UVSD model to argue that OG may have been reporting
recollection at a lower threshold of recognition memory strength
than were the controls—that is, he used a more liberal strength
criterion for recollection. The argument goes that this may have
had the effect of improving recollection discrimination of studied
versus unstudied faces so as possibly to normalize it. However,
this would only have happened provided he did not show a marked
increase in recollection false positives, which is likely, because if
OG was willing to report less confident recognition as recollection,
this would almost certainly have increased his false alarm rate.
OG’s possible bias might also have decreased his familiarity
discrimination score, because he should have reported fewer strong
familiarity responses. The UVSD view assumes that whether rec-
ollection or familiarity is reported depends solely on recognition
memory strength. This assumption is wrong according to the
DPSD model, because it also critically depends on whether a
person feels he or she is or is not recalling study-context details
that are not present. However, even ignoring these serious con-
cerns about the validity of the UVSD argument, our findings
showed that OG’s criteria for both familiarity and recollection,
calculated assuming signal-detection theory, did not differ from
those of the controls. The UVSD argument does not, therefore,
explain the findings obtained.
The conclusion that familiarity was impaired selectively by
mMDT damage is strengthened, because OG’s lesion may have
partially disconnected his MTT and may also have included his
central medial midline nucleus, a thalamic structure considered by
the MEMN extension of the DPSD model. If the thalamic connec-
tivity of the hippocampal system was partially disrupted by lesions
of the central medial midline nucleus and/or the MTT, then the
DPSD/MEMN view would predict a disruption of recollection
such that any evidence of impaired recollection and free recall of
visual information might be attributable this. Similarly, if OG’s
right-sided medial thalamic damage disrupted projections with
other subcortical structures considered to modulate arousal and
attention (Aggleton et al., 2011), then the DPSD/MEMN view
again would predict that recollection would have been likely to
have been more disrupted than familiarity insofar as it is more
arousal and attention demanding.
Both of these arguments also provide an explanation of why
OG’s previously reported visual recall was more impaired than his
novel facial recollection, for the following reasons. First, free
recall demands more effort at encoding and test than does recol-
lection (which is a more heavily cued form of recall), so if OG’s
medial thalamic damage extends into the midline and intralaminar
thalamic nuclei, the disruption of arousal/attention would affect
recall more than recollection. Second, if damage disrupts hip-
pocampal projections—by encroaching on the MTT and/or the
direct inputs between the central medial nucleus and the hip-
pocampus—free recall may be more impaired, because it is more
demanding of the extended hippocampal system’s resources and so
is more responsive to small amounts of damage. Recollection,
conversely, is less demanding, as it is in essence a form of cued
recall, with the probe cuing the retrieval of associations. Consider
the Rey Complex Figure Test, which OG had particular difficulty
recalling, as reported previously (Edelstyn et al., 2012). This figure
comprises many separate elements, and although they may be
unitized and recalled as a single entity at the local level, it is not
possible to do this at the global level. Thus, this recall task is
considerably more demanding than, for example, a novel facial
recollection task, in which the intraitem associations between the
eyes, nose, mouth, and so on are more readily bound together using
the spatial template of the face (e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranga-
nath, 2008; Mayes et al., 2004). (This point is considered later in
this section.) Accordingly, the inherent weakness within OG’s
episodic memory system, caused by the partial disconnection of
the MTT or the direct inputs between the central medial nucleus
and the hippocampus, only become evident when the system is
challenged using the particular stimuli and tasks found most dif-
ficult.
If one or both of these kinds of additional thalamic damage is
present in OG, even if the damage is slight, it is even more striking
how well preserved his novel face-triggered recollection was.
Further, the presence of such additional damage explains why
OG’s free recall was impaired on the Rey Complex Figure Test, as
previously reported, even if damage to the right-sided mMDT did
not disrupt recollection and free recall of visual stimuli at all, as the
strong form of the DPSD view proposes (Edelstyn et al., 2012).
Our study cannot, of course, resolve whether OG’s face familiarity
deficit was entirely attributable to mMDT damage or if additional
damage to the midline nuclei also contributed to the familiarity
impairment to an unknown degree, as suggested by the MEMN
extension of the DPSD model.
OG’s impairment in familiarity-driven recognition of novel
faces fits well with Smith et al.’s (2014) recent study of patients
with bilateral lesions of the hippocampus or more extensive ones
of the MTL that included the perirhinal cortex. Both groups
showed, even at a short retention interval, deficits in recognition
memory of famous faces, inverted faces, buildings, and words,
whereas only the MTL group was deficient in recognition memory
of novel faces at this short retention interval. These findings imply
that recognition of novel facial memoranda, unlike the other cat-
egories, is independent of the hippocampus but reliant on other
MTL structures such as the perirhinal cortex. By implication,
therefore, disruption of the perirhinal cortex within the MTL
memory structures—or of the structures to which the perirhinal
cortex projects, particularly the mMDT—should be marked by a
pronounced deficit in recognition memory of unfamiliar faces,
which is precisely what we found with OG.
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Smith et al. (2014) suggested that novel faces—unlike famous
faces, inverted faces, buildings, and words—can easily be pro-
cessed holistically (as a single item rather than a conjunction of
parts), so good recognition memory can be largely based on how
novel or familiar individual faces feel at test rather than having to
be based on identification of whether there is an association
between an item and its study context. Whereas Smith et al. did not
attempt to measure familiarity directly, we did, indicating that
novel face recognition was indeed largely mediated by face famil-
iarity. Smith et al.’s view is similar in some respects to the
convergence, recollection, and familiarity theory (CRAFT; Mon-
taldi & Mayes, 2010), which also proposes that the perirhinal
cortex binds object features rapidly together to form new unitized
object memory representations that support item familiarity mem-
ory. Unlike Smith et al., CRAFT proposes that perirhinal cortex
supports unitization of not only novel face inputs but also of other
object/item inputs, but perhaps to a lesser degree than with novel
faces (for evidence, see Holdstock et al., 2002; Mayes, Holdstock,
Isaac, Hunkin, & Roberts, 2002). However, although CRAFT
proposes that the perirhinal cortex forms direct (but not usually
unitized) object–object associative memory representations, it also
holds that all associations with different kinds of components that
are processed in distinct medial temporal neocortical regions, such
as item–context associations, converge mainly in the hippocam-
pus, which creates pattern-separated representations that support
only recollection. This is contrary to Smith et al., who seem to hold
that item–context associations are formed in the hippocampus that
are able to support both associative familiarity and recollection
(which is, by definition, an associative form of memory). At
present, there is no convincing evidence that there are associative
familiarity memory–supporting, object–context associations, let
alone that they are hippocampally created representations, sup-
ported by the hippocampus and not the perirhinal cortex (see
Montaldi & Mayes, 2010).
Given that relatively selective familiarity deficits have only
rarely been reported, OG’s familiarity deficiency for previously
novel faces is a first step toward providing the opposite dissocia-
tion to reports of a severe and disproportionate impairment in
recall/recollection and lesser impairment in recognition with pre-
served familiarity following lesions of the extended hippocampal
circuit. This more common kind of dissociation has been reported
quite often. For example, Mayes et al. (2002) described a patient,
YR, who had bilateral hippocampal lesions and who showed a
severe impairment in recall (mean z  3.6), whereas recognition
performance (across a total of 43 recognition tests) revealed much
higher levels of preservation (mean z  0.5), and Holdstock et
al. (2002) found evidence that this patient’s familiarity memory
was fully preserved.
Similar disproportionate impairments in recall/recollection have
been reported in other patients with lesions of the hippocampus
(e.g., Aggleton et al., 2005; Bastin et al., 2004; patient PR, re-
ported by Holdstock et al., 2008), the MTT (patient GP, reported
by Carlesimo et al., 2007; Serra et al., 2013; see also review by
Carlesimo et al., 2015), the anterior thalamus (patient QX, reported
by Edelstyn, Ellis, Jenkinson, & Sawyer, 2002; Edelstyn, Hunter,
& Ellis, 2006), and the fornix and the mammillary bodies (Tsivilis
et al., 2008; Vann et al., 2009).
Taken together, OG’s data, showing a dissociation between
familiarity and recollection for faces add to the growing evidence
base supporting the DPSD view that the neural structures support-
ing familiarity and recollection are dissociable. OG is not the first
patient to show this pattern; it was first shown by patient NB, who
demonstrated impaired familiarity and spared recollection follow-
ing resection of the perirhinal cortex that spared the hippocampus
(Bowles et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2011). OG is, nevertheless, as
far as we are aware, the first to demonstrate a similar selective
pattern of familiarity impairment following an mMDT lesion. The
DPSD-consistent familiarity role of the MDT is also supported by
recent complementary fMRI data showing that MDT blood oxy-
genation level–dependent activity is selectively up-regulated as
object picture familiarity memory confidence and accuracy in-
creases and that, when familiarity and recollection recognition
accuracy are matched, this structure shows significantly greater
activation with familiarity (Kafkas & Montaldi, 2014).
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